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ABSTRACT 
The population debate in the country has been dynamic and contentious. On the one 
hand, proponents of population management say that the rapid population growth in the 
Philippines has hindered the country’s economic development. On the other hand, others 
are saying that population growth is uncorrelated with economic growth. The core idea 
behind the link between population and economic growth is the demographic transition. 
Demographic transition is a change from a situation of high fertility and high mortality to 
one of low fertility and low mortality. Advocates of speeding the demographic transition 
placed emphasis on the need of public efforts to speed up the voluntary reduction in 
fertility rates as rapidly as possible, arguing that demographic transitions, where they 
have occurred, have typically been accelerated and even triggered, by proactive 
government policies. Those that are against direct government intervention argue that 
fertility rates fall when income rises and therefore, policies to increase income should be 
the main concern. This paper looks at the relationship between per capita income and 
total fertility rate (TFR), controlling for other factors, using a regional panel econometric 
model using data from the National Demographic and Health Survey (NDHS), Family 
Planning Survey (FPS), Family Income and Expenditure Survey (FIES), Labor Force 
Survey (LFS) and the Regional Gross Domestic Product (RGDP). The results show that 
increasing per capita income indeed reduces TFR but its impact is minimal and given that 
the country average per capita growth is low, it will take some time before the country 
benefits from the demographic transition through the income effect alone. The results of 
the analysis can also explain why the decline in fertility rate in the Philippines has been 
slower in recent times, lagging behind the significant changes in the international scene. 
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I. Introduction   
 
 The rapid population growth in the Philippines over the last several decades has 
hindered the country’s economic development. For the period 2000 - 2010, the 
Philippines had one of the highest population growth rates in the Southeast Asian region 
at 1.9 percent and the second largest population of more than 92 million in 2010, next 
only to Indonesia. It comes as no surprise that in 2009, 26.5 percent of our population, or 
an equivalent of 23 million Filipinos were living below the poverty line (NSCB).  
The core idea which links population and economic growth is demographic 
transition described as “a change from a situation of high fertility and high mortality to 
one of low fertility and low mortality.” A country that enters into a demographic 
transition experiences sizable changes in the age distribution of the population and this 
affects economic growth.  
 Unlike its Southeast and East Asian neighbors, the Philippines failed to achieve a 
demographic transition similar to what its neighbors had in the past three decades. In 
these countries, including the Philippines, mortality rates broadly declined at similar 
rates. In the Philippines however, fertility rates dipped slowly, so while population 
growth rates substantially dropped to below 2 percent a year in other countries (such as 
Thailand, Indonesia, and Vietnam), the Philippines’ high population growth rate of about 
2 percent per year hardly changed.  
 Studies show that demographic transition accounts for a significant portion (about 
one-third) of the economic growth experienced by East Asia’s economic “tigers” during 
the period 1965 to 1995 (Bloom and Williamson, 1997). The effect of the demographic 
transition on income growth is known as the first demographic dividend. In the course of 
the demographic transition, countries experience an increasing share of the working age 
population relative to the total population and this creates favorable effects on the per 
capita income. In addition to the first dividend, there is another positive effect on 
economic growth and is referred to as the second demographic dividend. This dividend 
results when individuals accumulate savings in their working years to serve as buffer 
during their retirement years. While accumulation of capital can be used to deal with the 
lowering of income in the older ages, this capital also influences economic growth. As 
Mason (2007) points out, it is when society increases its saving rate that results in a more 
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rapid economic growth – creating the second demographic dividend. Mason estimated 
that first and second demographic dividend account for 37.7% of the yearly average per 
capita growth rate of Japan from 1950 to 1980. The Philippines, with its high population 
growth, has not benefitted from the demographic dividend and partly explains why its 
economic growth pales in comparison with its East Asian Neighbors. The results of the 
study by Mapa and Balisacan (2004), using cross-country data from 80 countries over the 
period 1975 to 2000, showed that the difference in the population structure of Thailand 
and the Philippine accounts for about 0.768 percentage point of forgone average annual 
growth (missed first dividend) for the Philippines from 1975 to 2000. This forgone 
growth accumulates to about 22 percent of the average income per person in the year 
2000. It is even more impressive when translated into monetary values. It would have 
meant that rather than a per capita GDP of US$993 for the year 2000, Filipinos would 
have gotten US$1,210 instead. Moreover, poverty incidence would have been reduced by 
about 3.6 million. Less Filipinos would have been counted among the poor by the year 
2000. Even Jeffrey Sachs of the Earth Institute at Columbia University observed that the 
country’s TFR is “too high and something should be done to bring down the number of 
babies born per household to an average of two instead of the current three to promote 
economic growth and achieve social inclusion.”7  
 This paper looks at the determinants of total fertility rate (TFR) using econometric 
model from regional panel data. The paper argues that while increasing income reduces 
the TFR in the long run, the reduction is slow and thus, there is a need for an intervention 
(government initiative) that will voluntarily reduce the country’s TFR, particularly 
among poor households, to a level that is conducive to high economic growth.  It 
achieves this by performing scenario analysis to determine the level of future TFR under 
two assumptions: (a) reducing TFR through income growth and (b) reducing TFR 
through a combination of income growth and government intervention.   
 This paper is divided as follows: section 2 discusses the link between TFR and 
economic growth and the experiences of countries in East Asia; section 3 presents the 
econometric model using the regional panel data of the Philippines; section 4 estimates 
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 Statement of Dr. Jeffrey Sachs in a forum organized by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) during the 
2012 ADB Annual meeting held in Manila, Philippines.  
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the country’s future TFR under two scenarios previously discussed and section 5 
concludes. 
 
II. The Goldilock Period and High Economic Growth 
 As countries move from large families (high fertility rate) and poverty into small 
families (low fertility), high economic growth and ageing, they pass through what is 
called a Goldilock period: a generation or two in which fertility rate is neither too high 
nor too low (The Economist; October 2009). This fertility rate consistent with stable 
population is about 2.1 (also known as the replacement rate of fertility). The fall to 
replacement fertility is a unique and precious opportunity for higher economic growth. 
The figures in Table 1 show the Total Fertility Rates (TFR) for select countries in East 
Asia from the period 1960 to 2006. The table shows that poor and rich countries are 
racing though the demographic transition and achieving the replacement fertility rate of 
2.1: Singapore in the mid-1970s, South Korea in mid-1980s, Thailand in 1990, Vietnam 
and Myanmar in 2006.  
 It is interesting to note that only three (3) countries in the table have TFR of more 
than 3.0 in 2006: the Philippines (3.30), Lao PDR (3.29) and Cambodia (3.27). Moreover, 
Lao PDR and Cambodia have reduced their TFR much faster than the Philippines, having 
TFRs of about 6 during the 1990s compared to the Philippines’ TFR of 4.31. It will be 
disheartening to see that years down the road, Lao PDR and Cambodia will enjoy the 
dividend associated with the demographic transition and transform their economies to the 
level that will improve the lives of millions of their citizens, while the Philippines 
continues to languish in the high population growth-high poverty incidence trap.  
 
Table 1. Total Fertility Rate (TFR) for Selected East Asian Countries  
Year 
  1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2006 
South Korea        5.67         4.53         2.83         1.59         1.47         1.13  
ASEAN 5             
Singapore        5.45         3.09         1.74         1.87         1.44         1.26  
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Thailand        6.40         5.33         3.21         2.11         1.86         1.85  
Indonesia        5.52         5.35         4.36         3.10         2.42         2.23  
Malaysia        6.81         5.47         4.21         3.68         2.96         2.65  
Philippines        6.96         6.20         5.17         4.31         3.62         3.30  
Rest of SE Asia             
Vietnam        6.05         5.89         4.97         3.62         1.90         2.08  
Myanmar        6.06         5.98         4.54         3.38         2.41         2.10  
Brunei Darussalam        6.83         5.62         4.04         3.20         2.58         2.34  
Cambodia        6.29         5.81         5.84         5.73         3.96         3.27  
Lao PDR        6.42         6.42         6.41         6.08         4.03         3.29  
TFR is the average number of children a woman would bear during her lifetime given current age-specific 
fertility rates 
 
Speeding up the Demographic Transition 
 The effects of rapid population growth (or high fertility level) on economic growth 
and poverty have been carefully studied, documented and quantified by researchers and 
the results point to the same conclusion: that rapid population growth in poor and 
developing countries hinders economic development which pushes the next generation 
into the poverty trap. The Philippines appears to be the only country in all of Asia, and 
perhaps one of the few in the world, where the population issue remains controversial to 
this day.   
 The main policy issue that should be addressed immediately is how to harvest the 
demographic dividend quickly. Advocates of speeding the demographic transition placed 
emphasis on the need for public effort to accelerate voluntary reduction in fertility rates 
as soon as possible. Sachs (2008) pointed out that “demographic transitions, where they 
have occurred, have typically been accelerated and even triggered, by proactive 
government policies.” Thus, there is a need to influence public policies that play an 
important role in assisting, particularly the poor households, in achieving a voluntary 
reduction in fertility rates. This will relieve the direct pressures of population growth, 
particularly unwanted fertility estimated to contribute about 16% of the future population 
growth, through direct population policies.  
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 The current strategy of reducing total fertility rate by relying on the Natural 
Family Planning (NFP) methods clearly will not bring us to the Goldilock period at a 
faster pace. Even the then Health Secretary Esperanza Cabral realized this when she 
acknowledged that “even as population growth is coming down, it is not coming down at 
the rate necessary to improve the socioeconomic status of the country.” (Interview, 
Philippine Daily Inquirer, February 28, 2010) 
III. Econometric Model 
The econometric model for the determinants of the regional fertility rate is the fixed 
effects (FE) model for panel data given by,  
 
                      =  + 
 	 + 
 								 = 1,2, … ,14						 = 1,2,3                    (1) 
 
In here, yit is the fertility rate of region i at time t, the vector x represents the determinants 
of fertility that include income in real per capita GDP, proportion of household heads 
who have finished high school, female participation in the labor force and others, β is the 
vector of coefficients representing the structural parameters, αi represents the regional 
and unobservable fixed effect and uit is the random error term assumed to be normally 
distributed with mean 0 and constant variance σ2u.  
 
Averaging Equation (1) for each i over time, and noting that i is fixed across time, 
gives: 
 = 	̅ + 	̅ +⋯+ 	̅ +  + 
			 = 1,2,… ,14                  (2) 
 
Subtracting Equation (2) from Equation (1), 
 
 −  = 	 − ̅ + 	 − ̅ + ⋯+ 	 − ̅ + 
 − 
         (3) 
 
 Rewriting Equation (3) and adopting a new notation for the time-demeaned data obtains, 
 
7 
 
  = 	  + 	  +⋯+ 	  + 
  ,					 = 1,2,3						 = 1,2, … ,14   (4) 
 
The coefficients β are to be estimated using the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
regression. Fixed effects (FE) estimation allows for arbitrary correlation between αi and 
the explanatory variables (Wooldridge, 2003). In estimating Equation (4), there is a 
minor adjustment in the number of degrees of freedom. In the usual OLS case, when 
there are k parameters, N cross-sectional units and T time periods, the number of degrees 
of freedom would be NT – k. However, for each cross-sectional observation, we lose one 
degree of freedom due to time-demeaning. Thus the correct number of degrees of 
freedom is NT – N – k. The software used (STATA) by the authors incorporates this 
correction for degrees of freedom in estimating the regression coefficients. 
 
Heteroskedasticity-Robust Standard Error 
 
In the presence of heteroskedastic error terms (non-constancy of error variance), 
OLS estimates are still unbiased and consistent. However, they cease to be the Best 
Linear Unbiased Estimators (BLUE) of the coefficients. They become inefficient, and the 
reported standard errors are understated. By introducing heteroskedasticity-robust 
standard errors, White (1980) provided a convenient solution to this problem. His 
estimator is valid for heteroskedasticity of any form (including homoskedasticity).  The 
robust estimator is given by: 
!"	#$ 
% =	
∑ "̂(


) 
*
+
,,-(
  
where "̂( is the ith residual obtained by regressing xj on all other independent variables 
and SSRj is the sum of squared residuals from this regression. The square-root of the 
above quantity is called the heteroskedasticity-robust standard error. It is worth 
mentioning that in computing the value of the t-statistic, the value of the parameter 
estimate does not change, only the standard error does. As the sample size increases the 
distribution of the robust t-statistics resembles the t-distribution more closely. 
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Definition of the Dependent and Explanatory Variables 
 
A. Dependent Variable (Regional Total Fertility Rate or TFR)  
 
Demographers consider the TFR “the most refined measure of fertility, and the 
one most often used in fertility trend analysis” (Cabigon, 2006). It expresses the average 
number of births per woman if all women lived to the end of their childbearing years and 
bore children according to a given set of age-specific fertility rates in a given period. The 
1993, 1998, and 2003 NDHSs and the 2006 FPS are the sources of TFR data.  
 
B. Explanatory Variables 
 
i.  Regional Average Income 
The measure of Regional income is in terms of GDP per capita. GDP is the total 
amount of goods and services produced in a given area for a specific time. GDP per 
capita is computed by dividing GDP by the total population. In this paper, the NSCB is 
the data source for real GDP per capita. 
 
ii.  Index for Education 
As an index of the level of education in each region, the authors have looked into 
the proportion of household heads with at least high-school education. The data set was 
gathered from the Labor Force Surveys and compiled by the Asia-Pacific Policy Center 
(APPC). The data on educational profiles of household heads is available per region.  
 
iii.  Participation of Women in the Labor Force 
This paper also studies the effect of the female labor force participation rate 
(LFPR). The index used is the proportion of women ages 15 and above in the labor force. 
This is computed by the following formula: 
./01/	234- =
/0516/ + 
/0516/
760/	8/9	15		;6</
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where the old definition of unemployed is used (without work and seeking work or not 
seeking work due to some qualified reasons). The data source for this variable is the Asia 
Pacific Policy Center (APPC) compilation, which uses the figures from the Labor Force 
Survey (LFS).   
 
iv. Proportion of Elders 
The proportion of elders 64 years old and above will also be considered as an 
explanatory variable for fertility. A greater share of the elderly in the total population 
indicates that the age-structure does not bulge at the youth age, and should lower fertility. 
The data also come from the APPC-compiled LFS figures. 
 
v.  Contraceptive Prevalence Rate (CPR) 
Contraceptive Prevalence Rate measures the percentage of married women aged 
15-49 years who were using some method of family planning at the survey date. Use of 
contraceptive methods is a known fertility depressant; this justifies the need for a 
measure of contraceptive use in any estimation of fertility. The data were obtained from 
the ORC Macro (2006). 
 
Empirical Results 
The figures in Table 2 are the Regional TFRs for the survey periods 1998, 2003 
and 2008. Of the 17 regions, only the National Capital Region (NCR) had a TFR (2.3) 
that is near the replacement rate of 2.1 in 2008. The rest of the 16 regions had an average 
TFR of at least 3.0, with six regions having a TFR of at least 4.0 in 2008. The last column 
of Table 1 shows the change in the TFR from 2003 to 2008 and the figures suggest that 
the drop in TFR has been slow during the last five years,  with only six regions (NCR, 
CAR, MIMAROPA, Western Visayas, Northern Mindanao and SOCCKSARGEN) 
experiencing a drop of at least 0.1 per year in TFR.8 
 
                                               
8
  If this trend continues, it would take at least 10 years before the TFR in these regions (with the exception 
of the NCR) will be near the replacement rate of 2.1.  
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Table 2.Regional Total Fertility Rates (TFR) 
Region 
Total Fertility Rates 
1998 2003 2008 Change (’08-‘03) 
NCR 2.5 2.8 2.3 -0.5 
CAR 4.8 3.8 3.3 -0.5 
Ilocos Region 3.4 3.8 3.4 -0.4 
Cagayan Valley 3.6 3.4 4.1 0.7 
Central Luzon 3.5 3.1 3 -0.1 
CALABARZON 3.7 3.2 3 -0.2 
MIMAROPA - 5 4.3 -0.7 
Bicol Region 5.5 4.3 4.1 -0.2 
Western Visayas 4 4 3.3 -0.7 
Central Visayas 3.7 3.6 3.2 -0.4 
Eastern Visayas 5.9 4.6 4.3 -0.3 
Zamboanga 
Peninsula 
3.9 4.2 3.8 -0.4 
Northern 
Mindanao 
4.8 3.8 3.3 -0.5 
Davao Region 3.7 3.1 3.3 0.2 
SOCCSKSARGEN 4.2 4.2 3.6 -0.6 
Caraga 4.7 4.1 4.3 0.2 
ARMM 4.6 4.2 4.3 0.1 
Sources: NDHS 1998, 2003, 2008 final Reports, National Statistics Office (NSO); Collado (2010). 
 
The first two regression models using the panel fixed effects (FE) models are 
shown in Table 3a. The results show that all of the explanatory variables used are fertility 
depressants (an increase in these variables is expected to reduce fertility), hence the 
negative signs. It is important to note that the signs of the estimates agree with theory. 
The output affirms the significance of income as a determinant of fertility. Its estimates in 
both models are significant at the 1% level. Any attempt to reduce fertility rate should 
zero-in on policies that foster production at both the national and regional levels. 
Economic growth in all places including (and especially) the rural areas is an unfailing 
way to claim the promises of demographic transition. 
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Table 3a. Determinants of Fertility 
Dependent Variable: Regional Total Fertility Rate (TFR) 
 MODEL 1 MODEL 2 
Variable Coefficient S.E Coefficient S.E 
Regional Per Capita Income  
(in natural logarithm) -2.51*** 0.855 -2.78*** 0.594 
Education -1.87* 0.998 -2.08** 0.964 
Labor Force Participation -1.85 2.673 -1.78 2.57 
Proportion of Elderly -11.82 18.001 -15.82 15.73 
Contraceptive Prevalence -0.008 0.014 --- --- 
Constant 29.49*** 7.54 31.77*** 5.27 
Overall adjusted R2 0.50 0.48 
 *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Three of the five explanatory variables included in the model did not result in 
significant t-values. These are Female Labor Force Participation, Proportion of Elderly to 
Population, and the use of Contraceptives yielding p-values that are larger than 0.10. The 
final reduced model chosen by the authors is the model that best explains the variability 
in the TFR. The output is given in Table 3b. 
Table 3b. Final Model Determinants of Fertility 
Dependent Variable: TFR 
 MODEL 3 
Variable Estimate s.e. 
Log of Income -2.71*** 0.754 
Education -1.75* 1.02 
Labor Force 
Participation --- --- 
Proportion of Elderly -16.54 19.21 
Contraceptive 
Prevalence  -0.007 0.015 
Constant 30.48*** 6.86 
Overall adjusted R2 0.52 
  *significant at 10%;  **significant at 5%;  ***significant at 1% 
 
 
In the three models the significance of education in reducing fertility is very clear. 
It is without question that efforts at increasing income in the regions must be 
accompanied by efforts at raising the level of education in these areas. The tandem of 
higher income and higher education is perhaps the most reliable way of managing the 
country’s population. 
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IV. Simulation Analysis of Total Fertility Rate (TFR) under Two Scenarios 
 The slow pace by which the total fertility rate has been reduced from 6.96 in 1960 
to 3.30 in 2008 or a measly 1.6 percent per year can be attributed to a lack of concrete 
and proactive government policies on population management aimed at accelerating the 
demographic transition. The estimate of the coefficient of the logarithm of income in 
Table 3b may be interpreted as follows: Other things being the same, a 1% increase in 
income causes the TFR to decrease by 0.0271. The TFR for 2008 was 3.2, and for a TFR 
of 2.1 (replacement rate) to be reached, per capita GDP should increase by 45%. 
Assuming an average growth rate of 2% per year, the country will have to wait until 2030 
before hitting the replacement rate, all other things being equal.  
 
This wait is too long, and a little help from the educational sector is needed. If 
every year the proportion of household heads with at least a high school education 
increases by 0.1, the diminishing effect on TFR would be roughly 0.18 per year. The data 
shows that the proportion of household heads who are high school graduates is 
approximately 0.33. Thus it is still possible to raise this proportion to levels that depress 
fertility. This calls for a mammoth investment in education (in particular, an investment 
in high school education). For example, raising the level of education in the countryside 
to that of NCR’s levels will reduce TFR by 0.6, a huge drop that would bring the country 
much closer to the replacement rate. Assuming that the proportion of household heads 
with at least a high school education could increase by 0.1 each year is quite unrealistic. 
However, if it is to be assumed that this proportion could increase at a constant rate of 
0.02 per year, and if real per capita GDP also grows at a constant rate of 2%, the 
replacement rate could be achieved in ten years. 
 
What then will the TFR of the country in the future under the same set of policies 
(e.g. gearing towards the use of the natural family planning methods)? When do we 
achieve the Goldilock period that is conducive for higher economic growth under the 
status quo?    
 An essential variable that reduces fertility rate is income. The econometric model 
shows that as the income of the household increases, the fertility rate tends to decrease.  
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The figure 1 shows the relationship between regional per capita income (in natural 
logarithm) and the regional total fertility rates from 1993 to 2006. The figure shows that 
as the income of the regions increase, the TFR decrease. Again, it should be noted that no 
region has reach a TFR of 2.1.  
 
Figure 1. Relationship between TFR and per capita GDP by Philippine Regions  
(1993 to 2006) 
 
 
 
 Using the results of the econometric model that a one percent increase in per 
capita reduces TFR by 0.027 per year simulation analysis was made to plot the path of 
the country’s TFR under two scenarios. On the one hand, scenario 1 assumes the business 
as usual scenario where TFR is reduced mainly as a result of increasing income. This 
scenario assumes that the country’s GDP is growing at an average of 4 percent per year 
(and thus per capita GDP is growing at 2 percent per year, net of the population growth of 
about 2 percent per year). On the other hand, scenario 2 assumes the same average 
income growth of 4 percent plus government intervention to relieve the population 
2
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pressure from unwanted fertility, estimated to account for 16 percent of the future 
population growth.9 To be more realistic, scenario 2 further assumes that only 90 percent 
of the households with unwanted fertility will be covered by the government program.  
 
 The current and future TFRs under these two scenarios are presented in Figure 2. 
Using the 2008 TFR of 3.3 as base value, in the business as usual scenario 1, the 
Goldilock period will be reached by 2030, or twenty years from now. In the second 
scenario where government intervention targets only households with unwanted fertility, 
the Goldilock period will be achieved 10 years early or in about 2020.         
 
 
Figure 2. Total Fertility Rates under Two Scenarios 
 
 
  
 The same simulation exercise was made for the poorest 40 percent of the 
households, where the TFRs are high. In 2008 for example, while the overall TFR of the 
country is 3.30, the TFR of the poorest 20 percent (or the bottom quintile) is at 5.20 and 
the second quintile at 4.20. The values in Table 2 show that, under the status quo, the 
households in the bottom quintile will not experience the Goldilock period in this 
generation. The TFR of the poorest 20 percent of the households 30 years from now (or 
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in 2040) will be at 3.47. This estimated TFR in 2040 will still be higher than the recorded 
TFR of Thailand in 1980 at 3.21. Under scenario 2 where government intervenes through 
proactive population management policies, the TFR of the poorest 20 percent will be at a 
manageable level of 2.31 by the year 2040.  
 
 For households in the second quintile, the TFR will still be at 2.47 in year 2040 
under the status quo, while the Goldilock period will be achieved earlier in year 2030 
when the TFR for this group is projected to be at 2.07. 
 
Table 2. Total fertility rates of the second and bottom quintile under two scenarios 
 
2008 2010 2020 2030 2040 
Second quintile      
Scenario 1 4.20 4.09 3.55 3.01 2.47 
Scenario 2 4.20 3.16 2.62 2.07 1.53 
Bottom quintile      
Scenario 1 5.20 5.10 4.55 4.01 3.47 
Scenario 2 5.20 3.93 3.39 2.85 2.31 
 
 
V. Conclusion  
 Addressing the poverty problem is the single most important policy challenge 
facing the country today and one cannot ignore the growing number of empirical 
evidence linking population growth on the one hand and poverty on the other. 
Development policies aimed at addressing the alarming poverty incidence in the country 
must include measures that will manage the country’s bourgeoning population and bring 
down the fertility rate to a level that is conducive to higher economic growth. Policy 
makers must address the country’s rapid population growth head-on though proactive 
government policies, such as the Reproductive Health (RH) bill. The failure to pass the 
RH bill will be very unfortunate for the damage that a rapid population growth will bring 
to this generation and the next are irreversible. We simply cannot afford to have millions 
of Filipinos go through the vicious cycle of high fertility and poverty:  high fertility rate 
prolongs poverty in households and poor households contribute to high fertility rates.  
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 Government must intervene to break this cycle by creating policies that will 
increase the capacity of women to participate in the labor market, invest in health to 
decrease child mortality and enhance education, particularly of women. These are the 
policies that have been found successful in reducing fertility rates in households. At the 
same time, government must also directly intervene by, for example, providing 
contraceptive services to poor households that cannot afford these contraceptive services 
for, without such government support, the fertility rates in these households will remain 
high and unmanageable condemning them to poverty. We cannot afford to ignore the 
population issue because population gravely affects our country’s growth and 
development and as it is, we are paying a high price for our rapid population growth.  
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